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Semantic dementia patients seem to have better knowledge of information linked to
the self. More specifically, despite having severe semantic impairment, these patients
show that they have more general information about the people they know personally
by direct experience than they do about other individuals they know indirectly. However,
the role of direct personal experience remains debated because of confounding factors
such as frequency, recency of exposure, and affective relevance. We performed an
exploratory study comparing the performance of five semantic dementia patients with
that of 10 matched healthy controls on the recognition (familiarity judgment) and
identification (biographic information recall) of personally familiar names vs. famous
names. As expected, intergroup comparisons indicated a semantic breakdown in
semantic dementia patients as compared with healthy controls. Moreover, unlike healthy
controls, the semantic dementia patients recognized and identified personally familiar
names better than they did famous names. This pattern of results suggests that
direct personal experience indeed plays a specific role in the relative preservation of
person-specific semantic meaning in semantic dementia. We discuss the role of direct
personal experience on the preservation of semantic knowledge and the potential
neurophysiological mechanisms underlying these processes.
Keywords: semantic memory, semantic dementia, autobiographical memory, personally familiar names, famous
names, personal experience, self
Abbreviations: MMSE, Mini Mental State Examination; PIN, Person Identity Node.
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INTRODUCTION
Semantic dementia, also known as the temporal variant of
frontotemporal dementia (Goulding et al., 1989; Snowden et al.,
1989; Hodges et al., 1992; Hodges and Graham, 2001), is
characterized by a progressive and selective disorder of semantic
knowledge (Hodges et al., 1992). The selective nature of this
semantic deficit, originally reported by Warrington (1975), is
confirmed by good performances on day-to-day, short-term, and
working memory tasks and by the preservation of visuospatial,
nonverbal reasoning, phonological, and syntactic capacities
(Hodges et al., 1992; Snowden et al., 1996b). This syndrome is
underlain by morphological and functional alterations of a large-
scale brain network, predominantly including the temporal lobes,
but more specifically the temporopolar regions (anterior and
inferior temporal poles). It comprises a pattern of atrophy that
affects one or both hemispheres, as well as the orbitofrontal and
anterior cingulate cortices, fusiform gyrus, amygdaloid complex,
insula, thalamus, caudate nucleus, and the anterior part of the
hippocampus (Mummery et al., 1999, 2000; Chan et al., 2001;
Galton et al., 2001; Gorno-Tempini et al., 2004; Ibach et al., 2004;
Short et al., 2005; Desgranges et al., 2007; La Joie et al., 2013, 2014;
Viard et al., 2013, 2014).
Semantic dementia syndrome represents a model of
considerable value for studying the internal organization of the
semantic memory system, given that loss of meaning of concepts
is not absolute (e.g., Merck et al., 2013). It also represents a
unique model for studying the dynamic interplay between
semantic memory and other systems, such as autobiographical
memory. Indeed, one of the most striking modulatory effects of
semantic memory performance in semantic dementia is related
to personal or autobiographical relevance. Autobiographical
information about oneself may be better preserved than
impersonal (cultural or other) information. Semantic dementia
patients seem to recognize their own objects, but not similar
objects belonging to another person (Snowden et al., 1994,
1995; Bozeat et al., 2002; Giovannetti et al., 2006). They also
recognize famous places that they have personally visited better
than places they have never been to (Snowden et al., 1994;
Westmacott et al., 2001). Autobiographical relevance influences
the arithmetic performance of semantic dementia patients
(Julien et al., 2010); similarly, they are able to categorize images
or words that are relevant to their own experience but are unable
to perform formal categorization tasks as well (Snowden et al.,
1995). In addition, they seem to recognize and identify their
relatives more easily than they do other famous individuals
who are not relevant to their autobiography (Snowden et al.,
1994; Graham et al., 1997; Westmacott et al., 2001, 2004; Joubert
et al., 2004). This phenomenon has been called ‘‘cognitive
egocentrism’’ (Belliard et al., 2001) in reference to the behavioral
egocentrism that characterizes behavioral changes in semantic
dementia (Bozeat et al., 2000; Rankin et al., 2005; Lough et al.,
2006).
However, this notion is difficult to define and operationalize
in the context of the performance evaluation of patients. The
literature indeed provides various definitions of the notion
of personal or autobiographical effect that may obscure the
identification of factors that determine the preservation of
semantic meaning in semantic dementia (for terminology, see
Box 1). For some authors (Van Lancker, 1991), the concept
of personal experience implies an affective or emotional
relationship between the subject and an ‘‘object,’’ independent
of the frequency of occurrence and familiarity. Other authors
used the concept of personal experience in semantic dementia
independently of the affective or emotional value referring
to ‘‘autobiographical significance’’ (Westmacott et al., 2001,
2004), defining this notion as ‘‘specific personal memories
containing episodic, contextual details that are associated with
a non-autobiographical semantic concept’’ (Westmacott and
Moscovitch, 2003, p. 25). Accordingly, semantic concepts that
have special autobiographical significance possess a wealth
of ‘‘extra’’ information such that their representations are
colored by personal experience (Westmacott et al., 2004, p. 26).
In normal subjects, this personal significance may involve
various levels of autobiographical knowledge from episodic
to more personal semantic representation (Piolino et al.,
2007). Indeed, autobiographical memory implies different
kinds of knowledge pertaining to oneself, either episodic or
semantic (Piolino et al., 2009). For Snowden et al. (1994),
the main critical feature of personal experience in semantic
dementia is the direct experience between the subject and
the concept, object, person, etc., rather than emotional
factors or affects, personal contexts, or autobiographical
significance. Only ‘‘objects’’ (people, locations, buildings,
etc.) that have been personally and directly experienced
by the subject can be included in the category of the
personally relevant. For instance, Barack Obama’s face
or voice may be familiar and/or frequently encountered
and may even induce emotional and affective reactions.
Nevertheless, as many people have never personally and/or
directly met the American President, his face or voice is
not personally relevant to the majority of the population.
In summary, Snowden et al. (1994) suggested that personal
relevance stems from the subject’s private and direct personal
experience.
Snowden et al. (1994) evaluated the ability of semantic
dementia patients to recognize and identify the names of
personally relevant people (family members, neighbors, etc.)
and those of famous people. They found that semantic
dementia patients performed considerably better for the former
type of items than for the latter, a pattern of findings
not seen in Alzheimer’s disease patients (Snowden et al.,
1995). The results have been interpreted by this group
(Julien et al., 2008) in the context of the script theory
originally developed by Funnell (2001). Accordingly, conceptual
knowledge would be represented at different levels of abstraction,
from information that is embedded in specific contexts relating
to personal experience, to information that is relatively context
free. In semantic dementia, the most abstracted levels of
knowledge would become compromised so that patients become
increasingly reliant on meaning that is grounded in personal,
everyday experience (Julien et al., 2008).
That being said and by contrast, other authors
(Greene and Hodges, 1996; Graham and Hodges, 1997;
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 November 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 625
Péron et al. Personal Experience and Semantic Dementia
BOX 1 | Concept of direct personal experience
Although direct personal experience could influence the preservation of semantic knowledge in semantic dementia, the meaning of the concept is not obvious in the
literature. Author’s definitions of this concept are contradictory. In fact, various terms that refer to this notion can be found in the literature, such as “personal relevance”
(Van Lancker, 1991), “experiential effect” (Snowden et al., 1994, 1995, 1996a; Snowden, 1999), or “autobiographical significance” (Westmacott et al., 2001, 2004).
The literature provides three main definitions for the notion of direct personal experience.
First, according to Van Lancker (1991), the concept of direct personal experience refers to the notion of valence, which implies a relationship between the subject
and an “object,” but can be distinguished from the notion of frequency or familiarity. This definition seems to be close to the notion of affective or emotional factors
because “the personally familiar objects acquire for each person an historical, unique relationship” (Van Lancker, 1991, p. 66). In addition, Van Lancker specifies that
personal relevance comes from private and cultural experience alike. Some objects or persons may be personally relevant because of the role they play in one’s
private life (for instance, one’s wife or husband, house, or bunch of keys), or because of the role they play in the collective background (e.g., the Eiffel Tower or the
French president, François Hollande, for the French).
Second, (Westmacott et al., 2001, 2004) and Westmacott and Moscovitch (2003), who use the term “autobiographical significance,” define this concept as
“specific personal memories containing episodic, contextual details that are associated with a non-autobiographical semantic concept” (Westmacott and Moscovitch,
2003, p. 25). To illustrate their definition, the authors suggest the following example. Autobiographically significant knowledge about John Lennon may include a
particular memory of hearing about his assassination. In contrast, semantic concepts include the fact that John Lennon was the singer of the Beatles or that he was
married to Yoko Ono. The definition seems similar to the concept of “flashbulb memories” (Brown and Kulik, 1977), which is a memory of the personal circumstances
in which one first learned of a surprising public event (Conway et al., 1994). In short, “semantic concepts that have some special autobiographical significance
possess a wealth of ‘extra’ information such that their representations are colored by personal experience” (Westmacott and Moscovitch, 2003, p. 26). This personal
experience may be of a different nature ever personal semantic or episodic (Piolino et al., 2007).
Third, Snowden et al. (1994) suggested that personal experience was not equivalent to familiarity or frequent exposure, although personally relevant concepts
could also be familiar and/or frequent. Snowden et al.’s definition is very different, however, from that of Van Lancker. Indeed, their notion refers to direct and personal
experience between the subject and the concept, object, person, etc., rather than to emotional factors or affects. Also in opposition to Van Lancker (1991), Snowden
et al. (1994) do not consider famous persons or famous building, places, or locations to be personally relevant. Only “objects” (persons, locations, buildings, etc.)
personally and directly experienced by the subject are included in the category of personally relevant. For instance, François Hollande’s face or voice might be familiar
and/or frequently encountered and might even induce emotional and affective reactions. Nevertheless, many people have never personally and/or directly met the
French President, making his face or voice not personally relevant for the majority of people. In contrast, faces or voices of family members, friends, or other people
that the subject has directly met are considered as personally relevant to the subject and could also be considered frequent and familiar. To summarize, Snowden
et al. (1994) suggest that the personal relevance notion results from the subject’s private, direct, and personal experiences.
We have adopted this latter definition because it is the only one that emphasizes a clear difference between the process for persons we have met directly and
that for persons we have met indirectly or through the media. We chose to use the term direct personal experience to refer to this latter definition exclusively.
Hodges and Graham, 1998; Graham, 1999; Graham et al.,
1999, 2000) have suggested that direct personal experience
has no effect on previously established semantic memory in
semantic dementia. Graham et al. (1997) investigated the
hypothesis put forward by Snowden et al. (1994) by testing
familiarity and identification abilities in relation to personally
familiar names and famous names in two case studies of
semantic dementia. Although Graham et al. (1997) found that
personally familiar names were more likely to be correctly
recognized as familiar than were the names of celebrities, unlike
Snowden et al. (1994), they discovered that the identification
of these familiar names was severely impaired. In order to
explain the impact of direct personal experience on their
recognition task, Graham et al. (1997) raised the possibility
of methodological bias: (i) the frequency of exposure could
be greater for personally relevant names than for celebrities’
names; (ii) ‘‘there must be a stronger emotive quality to episodes
in which one plays an active role compared to those one hears
about or sees via the media’’ (Hodges and Graham, 1998,
p. 819); and (iii) the recency of autobiographical experiences
could be the key factor in determining the preservation
of semantic knowledge. In light of their results from the
identification task, the authors concluded that the productions
of the semantic dementia patients do not correspond to
genuine semantic knowledge but rather to knowledge that is
based on episodic memory or over-rehearsed and automatic
processes.
We therefore aimed at clarifying the role of direct personal
experience in the preservation of meaning in persons with
semantic dementia. Accordingly, the present study was based
on the construction of individual and idiosyncratic protocols,
avoiding methodological confounding factors emphasized by
Graham et al. (1997). Caregivers were asked to rate each name
for (i) frequency of encounter; (ii) emotional relevance; and
(iii) recency of exposure. The famous vs. personally familiar
names were matched for frequency of exposure and for affective
importance according to the caregivers’ ratings. Moreover, all
selected items referred to people the participant had known for
at least 10 years and to people the subject had met at least
once in the year preceding the investigation. Our goal was to
determine whether direct personal experience should indeed
be regarded as a specific contributing factor in the ability of
semantic dementia patients to recognize and identify individuals
in their everyday lives. We compared the performance of five
semantic dementia patients with 10 matched healthy controls
on the recognition (familiarity judgment) and the identification
(biographic information recall) of names of persons for whom
they did or did not have direct personal experience (i.e.,
personally familiar names vs. names of celebrities). We expected
an effect of direct personal experience on the performance of
semantic dementia patients, unlike that of healthy controls.
That is, we expected semantic dementia patients to show better
performance when person’s names were embedded in a personal
context after we controlled for bias evoked in the literature.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Two groups took part in the experiment: a study group consisting
of semantic dementia patients and a healthy control group. This
study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations
of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (and
approved by the local ethics committee, University Hospital
of Rennes, France) with written informed consent from all
participants. All participants gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Semantic Dementia
We examined five semantic dementia patients (one woman and
four men), with a median age at the time of the assessment of
69.6 years (range: 54–74 years). All had a history of insidiously
progressive semantic disorder extending over several years
(mean duration = 2.6 years, range: 1–5 years) and had been
diagnosed with semantic dementia according to the criteria
established by Neary and Snowden (1988) (Mini Mental State
Examination (MMSE), mean = 18.8, range: 13–27; Folstein
et al., 1975). At their initial presentation, all patients had
reported problems in naming and comprehension. Their day-
to-day memory was well preserved, and all of them could find
their way around the home without getting lost. Abnormal
behaviors, such as repetitive clock watching or other behavioral
routines previously shown to be characteristic of semantic
dementia (Snowden et al., 2001), were reported in every
case. In all patients, neuroimaging (1.5-T magnetic resonance
imaging) revealed atrophy of the temporal lobes. In one patient
(T.A.), atrophy was located in the right lobe, in two patients
(M.N. and R.J.) there was no obvious asymmetry, and in
two patients (M.A. and P.G.), atrophy was located in the left
lobe.
Healthy Controls
The healthy participants were 10 older (mean age = 68.7) healthy
adults (5 men). They completed a questionnaire about their
education and medical history. The inclusion of participants
was based on the absence of neurological or psychiatric medical
history and the absence of reports of memory problems. No
medication known to impair memory was permitted. Moreover,
older adults were screened for dementia by using the MMSE
(> 26/30). This group was matched to the semantic dementia
group for age and educational background.
General Neuropsychological Assessment
Sociodemographic and Background
Neuropsychological Data (Excluding Memory)
For each patient, in addition to MMSE, a general
neuropsychological examination was used to explore global
cognitive efficiency by means of the Mattis Dementia Rating
Scale (MDRS; Mattis, 1988) and language abilities by means of
irregular word reading and repetition, abstract and concrete
sentence repetition, a picture-naming task, the DO80 (Deloche
and Hannequin, 1997), and the token test (De Renzi and
Vignolo, 1962). Visuospatial abilities were measured by the
copying of a complex figure (Rey figure taken from Lezak, 1976)
and by the matching of identical figures and jumbled-up figures
(french test called ‘‘Protocole Montréal-Toulouse d’Evaluation
des Gnosies Visuelles’’, PEGV; Agniel and Joanette, 1992).
Executive functions were evaluated by the modified card-sorting
test (Nelson, 1976), and in addition for semantic dementia
patients, by the Stroop test (Stroop, 1935) and the trail-making
test, parts A and B (Reitan, 1958). Problem solving was evaluated
by means of Raven’s colored progressive matrices (Raven, 1965).
Memory-Related Neuropsychological Data
The semantic dementia patients underwent working, episodic,
and semantic memory assessments. Working memory was
evaluated by means of a digit span test (forward and backward;
Weschler, 1991). A visuospatial episodic learning task was
conducted by using the ‘‘Test de la Ruche’’ (Violon and Wijns,
1984). In this test, patients had to learn the position of 10
black boxes in a 41-box matrix. Lastly, semantic memory was
assessed by means of two tasks based on words and pictures: the
French celebrities questionnaire (described in Piolino et al., 2003)
and a semantic sorting test, which is a type of categorization
task. In the latter, patients were presented with 64 words and
the corresponding colored pictures. The procedure consisted of
sorting the words or pictures first into superordinate categories
(e.g., ‘‘animals’’), and then into subordinate categories (e.g.,
‘‘wild’’ vs. ‘‘domestic’’; for a full description see Merck et al.,
2013).
Results of the Neuropsychological Assessment
In brief, the data, reported in Table 1, clearly indicated that the
semantic dementia patients displayed massive semantic memory
difficulties, with anomy, surface dyslexia (all patients showed
disturbance of irregular word reading), and impoverished
general semantic knowledge of concepts (all patients failed the
DO80 picture-naming task and the two semantic knowledge
tasks). In addition, executive deficits were observed for three
of the five patients. We did not notice individual differences
associated with the side of atrophy. No deficit in episodic
memory was observed for any of the patients.
Experimental Tasks
The participants were asked to recognize as familiar the names of
people and then to identify those they knew either personally by
direct experience or by indirect sources.
Material
Sixty names, divided into three categories, were used for each
participant: (i) 20 personally familiar names, consisting of people
the participant knew personally (family members, neighbors, or
friends); (ii) 20 names involving no direct personal experience,
consisting of famous people the participant had known before
the onset of the illness; and (iii) 20 unknown names that
were especially constructed for the experiment that served as
distracters. The famous vs. personally familiar names were
matched for the frequency and recency of exposure and for
affective importance.
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TABLE 1 | Clinical, demographic, and neuropsychological data of each semantic dementia patient.
Semantic dementia patients
M.N T.A. M.A. R.J. P.G.
Patient’s initials
Age (years) 72 72 74 71 54
Duration of illness (years’ post onset) 5 3 2 1 2
MMSE 22 27 13 13 19
Educational background (years) 9 7 7 7 12
Handedness R R R R R
Mattis (out of 144) 97 120 92 87 111
Temporal atrophy B R L B L
Instrumental functions
Irregular word reading (out of 18) 15 14 3 13 16
Irregular word repetition (out of 18) 18 18 18 18 18
Picture naming DO80 (out of 80) 30 30 15 11 16
Syntactic comprehension: token test (out of 36) 33 34 26 13 27
Matching of identical figures PEGV (out of 10) 10 10 10 10 10
Jumbled-up figures PEGV (out of 36) 33 35 33 34 36
Copying of the Rey figure (out of 36) 36 33 36 34 35
Executive and attentional functions
MCST (Nelson perseverations) 4 7 2 16 0
Stroop (Interference score) 5 8 9 1 7
TMT B-A (s) 141 153 62 – 33
Coloured progressive matrices (out of 36) 31 27 32 26 35
Working memory
Direct digit span subtest of the WAISR 4 4 4 7 6
Indirect digit span subtest of the WAISR 4 4 3 4 5
Visuospatial episodic memory
Average of the 5 recalls1 (out of 10) 8.4 7.6 7.8 4.2 6.6
Recognition1 (out of 10) 10 10 10 5 10
Delayed recall1 (out of 10) 10 10 10 4 8
Semantic memory
Famous name recognition2 60 60 0 10 90
Famous face recognition2 40 40 0 0 80
Famous name identification2 49 49 0 0 65
Famous face identification2 35 35 0 0 51
Superordinate category sorting WORDS3 59 60 13 31 44
Superordinate category sorting PICTURES3 64 64 64 60 63
Subordinate functional category sorting WORDS3 59 46 37 36 25
Subordinate morphological category sorting WORDS3 48 57 28 33 37
Subordinate functional category sorting PICTURES3 59 64 57 47 52
Bold indicates impaired performance (p < 0.05); dash (−) indicates test was not performed. B, bilateral; MMSE, Mini Mental State Examination; L, left; MCST, Modified
Wisconsin Sorting Test; PEGV, Protocole d’Evaluation des Gnosies Visuelles (visual gnosia evaluation protocol); R, right; TMT, Trail Making Test; WAISR, Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale Revised. 1Test de la Ruche; 2recognition and identification of celebrities; 3semantic sorting test.
1. The personally familiar names were the names of people
who were familiar or close to the participant. Names of
family members, friends, or neighbors were supplied by the
patients’ caregivers or participants’ family members. For each
item, they were asked to date the earliest and most recent
encounters between the participant and the item. All selected
items referred to people the participant had known for at
least 10 years and to people the subject had met at least
once in the year preceding the investigation. Caregivers and
family members were then asked to rate the frequency of
encounters and emotional relevance between the participant
and the item on two behavioral scales representing a very low
to a very high value (1–10 points). All items scoring under
five were regarded as low frequency or low emotional value,
and all items over five were regarded as high frequency or
high emotional value. Lastly, caregivers and family members
were asked to provide as much semantic information as they
could about each item (e.g., status, occupation, number of
children, address). The aim was to get them to provide the
most discriminating information possible.
2. The names of famous people who participants had no direct
personal experience with were selected in consultation with
each patient’s caregiver or participant’s family member. These
names corresponded to celebrities (politicians, comedians,
actors, TV personalities, singers, etc.) whowere well-known to
the participants but whom the participants had never directly
and personally met. In order to select these items, we used the
same procedure as for the personally familiar names.
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3. The unknown names were made up of combinations of first
names and surnames or of a mixture of direct personal
experience surnames and fictitious first names. The caregiver
or family member was asked to confirm that all the fake first
name-surname associations were unknown to the participant.
After the initial selection of items (famous and personally
familiar names) with each patient’s caregiver or participant’s
family member, we chose the items with the highest (seven or
more on Likert scales) and lowest scores (three or less on Likert
scales) on the two behavioral scales in order to obtain the most
discriminating items. Moreover, in the case of the personally
familiar names, we excluded as many redundant items as possible
(e.g., sharing identical surnames). Finally, all the items were
matched in terms of consonance and country of origin (all names
sounded French) and in terms of construction (all items were
composed of a first name and a surname).
Procedure
Each participant was asked to carry out two tasks (familiarity
judgment and identification recall tasks) without time constraint.
The items or instructions were repeated during the tasks as many
times as necessary. The total duration of the procedure was about
2 h per patient on average.
Familiarity judgment task
Sixty names were presented to the participants: 20 personally
familiar names, 20 famous names, and 20 lures. All items were
presented in both written and oral form and in random order.
Prior to the experiment, the participants were informed that
they would see and hear names of people in their circle of
family and friends, names of celebrities, and names of people
they did not know at all. For each name, the participants were
asked to say whether they knew the person or not (yes-no
recognition). Thereafter, the participants were asked to check
their choices by placing them in their respective categories
(known or unknown).
Scoring. The total number of correct responses by condition was
calculated after the checking procedure (maximum = 20) and
expressed in terms of percentage. The 20 lures were used to
calculate the percentage of false recognitions.
Identification recall task
All names correctly identified as being familiar were shown to
the participants again. The number of trials (questions) presented
during the identification depended on the number of correct
recognitions in the familiarity judgement task; thus this was
different for each patient. They were then asked to provide
as much semantic information as possible about each person,
specifying his/her occupation, the names of his/her children,
his/her address, etc. If the participants provided only vague or
superordinate categorical responses (e.g., ‘‘He is the president’’
instead of ‘‘He is the French President), they were asked to
elaborate on their answer (e.g., ‘‘Yes, but president of which
country? When did he become president? What is his political
party?’’, etc). All the participants’ answers were taped on a
minidisc recorder.
Scoring. We adopted a strict scoring system that was based on
the procedure of Hodges and Graham (1998). Items classified as
familiar were scored on the identification task between 0 and 2,
as follows:
− 0 = ‘‘Don’t know’’ or an unrelated/incorrect response
− 1 = Superordinate (e.g., politician, sports personality, nephew,
etc.)
− 1.5 = A definition that described the person but failed to
distinguish him/her from a group of others (e.g., John Wayne
played in Westerns, Marie Dupont is my niece and Maryse’s
daughter—but Maryse has several daughters)
− 2 = A unique definition that described the person and
distinguished him/her from a group of others (e.g., Clint
Eastwood starred in the film The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
and also in Dirty Harry; Marie Dupont is my niece, she’s 22,
she’s got a sister and a brother, she’s studying chemistry)
To avoid bias, two raters performed the scoring for the
identification task independently by using the anonymous
interview recordings. For the personally familiar name scoring,
raters used all the semantic information supplied by the
caregivers or participants’ family members. The information
was scored on the basis of the number of items the participant
had classified as familiar according to the category (personally
familiar vs. famous). For each item, the mean of both raters’
scores was calculated to obtain a maximum score of two per item
and then the percentage of correct responses per category was
calculated.
Statistical Analysis
In view of the small sample size of the two groups, non-
parametric analyses were used for internal consistency. Inter-
group comparisons were examined by using the Mann-Whitney
U-test. Individual differences were examined by using Z scores.
Intra-group effects were examined with Wilcoxon pairwise
comparisons to evaluate the effect of the experimental condition
(personally familiar names vs. famous) in each group. We also
used Wilcoxon pairwise comparisons to evaluate whether ‘‘low
vs. high’’ emotional importance and ‘‘low vs. high’’ frequency
of encounter had an impact on performance, splitting our data
set according to this variable. For each task, first, we performed
intra-group comparisons, including both famous and familiar
names in the same model. Second, we analyzed famous and
familiar names separately. Correlation analysis was performed
with Spearman’s rank test. For these analyses, the unilateral
statistical level of significance was set at 0.05. The inter-rater
reliability of the scoring system on the identification recall
task was analyzed in a patient-by-patient fashion, using Kappa
coefficients.
RESULTS
Familiarity Judgment Task
Figure 1 illustrates the performances of the two groups on
the familiarity task in both experimental conditions (personally
familiar names vs. famous names).
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FIGURE 1 | Mean percentage of correct responses (and standard
errors) on the familiarity judgment task in both experimental
conditions (personally familiar names vs.famous names) by the
semantic dementia group (displayed by each patient in (A), at the
group level in (B) and the healthy controls (HC) (B) Bilateral, right, left:
laterality of the temporal atrophy. #Significant (p < 0.05) in comparison to
the healthy controls (inter-group analyses). ∗Significant (p < 0.05) in
comparison to the other experimental condition (intra-group analyses).
Inter-Group Comparisons
MannWhitney tests indicated that the semantic dementia group
performed significantly worse than the control group for both
conditions: the recognition of personally familiar (Z = −2.94,
p< 0.01) and famous names (Z =−3.06, p< 0.01).
Intra-Group Comparisons
Analyses revealed a significant effect of experimental condition
in the semantic dementia group: the personally familiar names
were far better recognized as being familiar than the famous
names were (Z =−1.75, p< 0.05). Moreover, analyses revealed a
significant effect of experimental condition in the control group
as well, but in the reverse sense: the famous names were better
recognized (100%) than the personally familiar names (96%)
(Z = 2.20, p < 0.05). Finally, the qualitative analysis of the lures
revealed 21% false recognitions in the semantic dementia group,
whereas no false recognitions were observed in the control group.
Identification Recall Task
Figure 2 illustrates the performances of the two groups on the
identification free-recall task in both experimental conditions
(personally familiar names vs. famous names). Kappa coefficients
revealed high inter-rater reliability (>0.75 for all items).
FIGURE 2 | Mean percentage of correct responses (and standard
errors) on the identification free-recall task in both experimental
conditions (personally familiar names vs. famous names) by the
semantic dementia group (displayed by each patient in (A), at the
group level in (B) and the healthy controls (HC) (B) Bilateral, right, left:
laterality of the temporal atrophy. #Significant (p < 0.05) in comparison to
the healthy controls (inter-group analyses). ∗Significant (p < 0.05) in
comparison to the other experimental condition (intra-group analyses).
Inter-Group Comparisons
Similar to the familiarity judgment task, analyzes revealed that
the semantic dementia group performed significantly worse than
the control group for both conditions: the identification of
personally familiar (Z = 3.06, p < 0.001) and famous names
(Z = 3.06, p< 0.001).
Intra-Group Comparisons
Analyses revealed that there was a significant difference between
the personally familiar names condition and the famous names
condition within the semantic dementia group (Z = 1.75,
p < 0.05), but no difference in the control group (Z = 1.01,
p> 0.10).
Qualitatively, the pattern of responses seemed to be similar
across semantic dementia patients, whether: (a) they were able
to give semantic information regarding the name presented
(superordinate response or even a specific response), or (b) they
did not provide any response, saying that they did not know the
name/person presented at all.
Impact of “Low vs. High” Emotional
Importance and Impact of “Low vs. High”
Frequency of Encounter
In order to evaluate whether ‘‘low vs. high’’ emotional
importance and ‘‘low vs. high’’ frequency of encounter had an
impact on the performances, we split our data set according to
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this variable; for all comparisons, we failed to reject the null
hypothesis (p> 0.1 for all comparisons).
Correlations between Clinical,
Demographic, and Neuropsychological
Data and the Name Recognition and
Identification Tasks
We found no significant correlation between the recognition tasks
(for both famous and familiar names) and any of the secondary
variables entered in the correlation analysis models.
However, analysis revealed a significant correlation between
the identification recall task of familiar names and the colored
progressive matrices (r = 0.900, p = 0.04), the TMT B–A
(r = −1.000), and the number of perseverations on the MCST
(r = −0.900, p = 0.04). Moreover, there was a significant
correlation between the identification recall task of famous names
and the familiarity judgment task of the famous names (r = 0.947,
p = 0.01), the direct digit span subtest (r = 0.918, p = 0.03),
the visuospatial episodic memory test (average of the five recalls
score: r = 0.975, p = 0.005 and delayed recall score: r = 0.918,
p = 0.03 of the ‘‘Test de la Ruche’’), and the semantic memory
test (superordinate category sorting of the pictures: r = 0.918,
p = 0.03).
Individual Differences
A measure of Z score was computed for each patient on
familiarity and identification tasks. Table 2 shows scores for each
semantic dementia patient.
For the familiarity judgment task, and for both experimental
conditions, all the patients showed pathological scores except the
only patient with right temporal atrophy (T.A.), who displayed
performances in the normal range (Z = −1.5) on the familiarity
judgment of personally familiar names. Moreover, all patients
performed significantly better on the personally familiar than on
the famous condition except the only patient with left temporal
atrophy (P.G.).
For the identification task, and for both experimental
conditions, all patients showed pathological scores. Moreover,
and as expected, all patients performed better on the personally
familiar than on the famous condition except T.A., who was
the most deficient on identification of personally familiar
names compared with the other patients with left or bilateral
atrophy. Thus, the relative dissociation in performance between
‘‘direct personal experience’’ and famous condition in semantic
dementia was confirmed at an individual level, with the exception
of patient T.A.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this exploratory study was to determine whether
direct personal experience should be regarded as a specific
contributing factor in the relative preservation of semantic
memory, especially the ability of semantic dementia patients to
recognize as familiar and identify those individuals that they
regularly come into contact with in their daily lives. Our results
plead in favor of this hypothesis, showing that semantic dementia
patients were better at recognizing personally familiar names
and at retrieving knowledge about these names than about
famous names. In contrast, as expected, the healthy control group
showed no such effect.
The key finding of our study is the facilitation effect of
direct personal experience on the recognition and identification
of people’s names in semantic dementia when frequency and
recency of encounter, as well as emotional relevance, were held
constant across experimental conditions. Our study therefore
seems to confirm the idea of earlier published studies concerning
the role of direct personal experience in the relative preservation
of name recognition and semantic knowledge in semantic
dementia (Snowden et al., 1994; Hodges and Graham, 1998). We
provided such evidence for relatively recent (within the last 10
years) personally familiar names. However, the performance of
semantic dementia patients with personally familiar names did
not reach the level of controls (except for the patient T.A. on
recognition) and thus the direct personal experience effect seems
to be a specific but moderate factor in familiarity judgment and
identification (see also Julien et al., 2010).
Before we draw any inferences from our results, it is
important to acknowledge several limitations of this study.
First, autobiographical memory was not specifically tested in
the neuropsychological assessment, which could represent a
limitation, notably in order to perform correlations between
this memory system and the performances on the recognition
and identification of people’s names. Second, although we
controlled for emotional importance and matched the two
TABLE 2 | Percentage of correct responses (and Z scores) in both experimental conditions (personally familiar names vs. famous names) in
performances of each semantic dementia patient on the familiarity judgment and identification free-recall task using a strict scoring system (see
Procedure).
Semantic dementia patients
Patient’s initials M.N. T.A. M.A. R.J. P.G.
Temporal atrophy Bilateral Right Left Bilateral Left
DPE familiarity 50% (−11.5) 90% (−1.5) 60% (−9.0) 85% (−2.75) 55% (−10.25)
Famous familiarity∗ 10% (NA) 60% (NA) 0% (NA) 75% (NA) 60% (NA)
DPE identification 45% (−14.97) 5% (−26.24) 65% (−9.37) 35% (−17.74) 72% (−9.86)
Famous identification 0% (−37.46) 8% (−34.25) 0% (−37.46) 17% (−30.67) 11% (−33.09)
Bold indicates impaired performance (Z < 1.83, p < 0.05; Z < 2.82, p < 0.01; Z < 3.25, p < 0.001). DPE, direct personal experience; NA, not applicable. ∗Absence of
variability across controls (correct performance = 100%).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 November 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 625
Péron et al. Personal Experience and Semantic Dementia
lists of names (famous vs. familiar) for this factor, we
did not control for positive vs. negative valence of the
stimuli. Accordingly, two different names may both have
high emotional relevance, but for different reasons (i.e., an
extremely positive or negative associated memory) and valence
can play an important role in memory retrieval (Hofmann
and Jacobs, 2014). In order to fine-grain our observations,
valence should be taken into account in future studies.
Third and finally, the degradation of semantic memory in
semantic dementia means that the few items that remain
intact could be hyperprimed (Calabria et al., 2009; Laisney
et al., 2011), as in the case of familiar people in our
context.
Now that our results seem to confirm the effect of direct
personal experience in semantic dementia, several questions need
to be addressed. First, what is the relevance (or impact) of these
results on theoretical accounts of models of name recognition
and identification?
Most of these models were built on the well-known and
hierarchically organized cognitive model of face recognition
described by Bruce and Young (1986). This model has been
extended to include recognition of name and voice (e.g.,
Belin et al., 2004; see also Young and Bruce, 2011). It is
important to keep in mind that recent findings challenged
some of these propositions and alternative models are
now being discussed (see Blank et al., 2014). In serial
bottom-up models of name processing (Valentine et al.,
1996), the presentation of a name is assumed to activate
a set of name recognition units. The activation of a name
recognition unit will then activate the store of semantic
information about that person. This occurs through a set
of multimodal nodes called person identity nodes (PINs).
It is thought that familiarity judgments (i.e., recognizing
whether a name is familiar) take place at the level of the
PINs (Burton et al., 1990; Burton and Bruce, 1992, 1993).
In addition, a single PIN has been assumed for each person.
Our results suggest that direct personal experience helps to
reinforce or support the PIN corresponding to that person
and would have an effect on the actual semantic level
(semantic system for persons), making it more resistant
to the semantic dementia disease. These results are in
accordance with the propositions by Snowden’s group
[Julien et al. (2008) and Funnell (2001)] that, in semantic
dementia, abstract semantic representations degrade, revealing
representations that are more dependent on everyday personal
experience.
The second question that our results raise is the following:
Why does direct personal experience have a specific role in
the preservation of person-specific feelings of familiarity and
semantic knowledge?What is the difference between the personal
experience of watching the French President on television and
the personal experience of seeing/interacting with your doctor?
The two types of experiences are episodic experiences.
However, one of them can be considered more distinctive
and complex. Indeed, direct personal experience knowledge is
usually represented more richly than is knowledge acquired
by indirect personal experience through the media, in terms
of sensory modality and information related to motion,
space, and time. Therefore, the effect of direct personal
experience may be based on multifaceted components, such
as gaze direction, movements, gestures, bodily expressions
and postures, and other nonverbal social information. Unlike
famous people, who are media-based and perceived in two
dimensions, direct experience with people concerns three
dimensions and specific spatiotemporal and action contexts.
In the present study, it is of interest that correlation analyses
seem also to plead in favor of distinct cognitive contributions
in each type of stimuli. Indeed, the identification of familiar
names was significantly linked with executive functions,
whereas the identification of famous names was significantly
linked with memory (working, semantic, and visuospatial
episodic memory systems). Moreover, some functional magnetic
resonance imaging studies carried out in healthy participants
have reported differential activation in the occipito-temporo-
parietal junction, the precuneus, and the posterior cingulate
cortex for personally familiar people as opposed to famous
people (Gobbini et al., 2004; Sugiura et al., 2006). More
specifically, larger responses to personally familiar names than
to famous names have been found in the caudal region of
the medial posterior cortex, but not in the rostral region.
The temporo-parietal junction and the right posterior middle
temporal gyrus have been implicated in social perception,
including the processing of the actions and intentions of others
(Allison et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2000; Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003), as well as egocentric spatial judgment (Neggers et al.,
2006). Taken together, these results led to the suggestion
that these regions ‘‘may play a role in egocentric visuospatial
representations of objects or events in person representation’’
(Sugiura et al., 2006, p. 857). Parallel to these results, imaging
studies in semantic dementia converge to show a rostrocaudal
gradient of alteration not only in the temporal lobe, but
also in the fusiform gyrus and the cingulate cortex, with
the anterior parts being more affected than the posterior
parts, at least in the early stages of the disease (Chan et al.,
2001; Desgranges et al., 2007; Brambati et al., 2009; Mion
et al., 2010; Viard et al., 2013, 2014). Given the role of the
medial posterior cortex in the recognition and identification
of personally familiar names, our finding of the relative
preservation of this category could be accounted for by
the relative preservation of the medial posterior cortex and
posterior cingulate at the beginning of the neurodegenerative
process.
Finally, the issue of laterality on the preservation of
personally familiar semantic meaning remains to be elucidated.
In this context, the performance of T.A., who presented a
right temporal atrophy, is of particular interest. Regarding
the familiarity judgment task, T.A. displayed a strong effect
of direct personal experience, given that his performances
on the recognition of personally familiar names were normal
in comparison to those of healthy controls (Figure 1).
However, regarding the identification task, T.A.’s performance
was massively impaired for personally familiar names (nearly
floor performance) as well as for famous names, unlike
the other patients (Figure 2). Consistent with this case
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report, the right lateral temporal cortex has been suggested
to play a role in remote episodic retrieval (Markowitsch,
1995), ecphorizing (i.e., associating and binding retrieval cues
to the retrieval itself) old episodic memories. It is thus
not clear why the patients with bilateral atrophy presented
a direct personal experience effect, but it is important
to keep in mind that bilateral atrophy of the temporal
lobe is most often predominant in the left hemisphere
in the early stages of semantic dementia (Chan et al.,
2001; Desgranges et al., 2007; Brambati et al., 2009; Mion
et al., 2010). Further neuropsychological studies, combined
with neuroimaging measures, will allow a more detailed
discussion of the issue of preferential neural asymmetry of
the direct personal experience effect on familiarity judgments
and semantic meaning in semantic dementia. Moreover, it
is also possible that the different anatomic distribution of
the pathological lesions could explain the heterogeneity of
the clinical individual profiles. In recent years, new disease
proteins and genes have been identified in semantic dementia,
leading to a better understanding of the molecular mechanisms
underlying this neurodegenerative disease. The vast majority
of semantic dementias are characterized by the abnormal
accumulation of TDP-43, but some semantic dementia patients
can also have tau pathologies: argyrophilic grain disease
and corticobasal degeneration (e.g., Neumann et al., 2006;
Deramecourt et al., 2010). In the speech disorder domain, the
different anatomic distribution of the pathological lesions has
been shown to be correlated to different language disorder
profiles across patients (Deramecourt et al., 2010). It would
also be interesting to characterize correlations between (person-
specific) semantic disorders and pathological diagnosis. Being
able to predict (ante mortem) the histological characteristics
from the clinical profile is one of the major challenges of the next
years.
CONCLUSION
In summary, our results plead in favor of the existence of the
direct personal experience factor, whichmay have a specific effect
on the preservation of name recognition and identification in
semantic dementia. That said, it appears to have only a moderate
effect because recognition and identification remain deficient
compared with healthy controls even in a low-demand task such
as a familiarity judgment. In line with bottom-up models of
name processing, the direct personal experience factor would
help to support the presemantic level (PIN) and would have
an effect on the semantic level (semantic system for persons).
Our results now need to be confirmed and reinforced by further
behavioral experiments using larger samples and exploring in
more detail the nature of direct personal experience on semantic
meaning through other modalities (such as faces or voices)
in order to ensure that this effect is a multimodal process.
Functional neuroimaging studies are also needed to explore the
neural basis of boost effects of direct personal experience on
the preservation of semantic memory in semantic dementia. At
a more clinical level, the identification of such boost effects
constitutes an appropriate target for neurorehabilitation in
semantic dementia.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the patients and their families for giving
up their time to take part in this study. Anne-Sophie Cocault and
Hélène Hébert helped with the experimental protocol.
REFERENCES
Agniel, A., and Joanette, Y. (1992). Protocole d’Evaluation des Gnosies Visuelles.
Isbergues: OrthoEditions.
Allison, T., Puce, A., and McCarthy, G. (2000). Social perception from visual
cues: role of the STS region. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 267–278. doi: 10.1016/s1364-
6613(00)01501-1
Belin, P., Fecteau, S., and Bédard, C. (2004). Thinking the voice: neural correlates
of voice perception. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 129–135. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.
01.008
Belliard, S., Perron, M., Rouyer, F., Golfier, V., Sartori, E., and Edan, G. (2001).
L’égocentricité cognitive et comportementale dans la démence sémantique:
tentative d’explication anatomo-fontionnelle. Revue Neurologique 157, 53–54.
doi: RN-10-2001-157-10-0035-3787-101019-ART54
Blank, H., Wieland, N., von Kriegstein, K. (2014). Person recognition and the
brain: merging evidence from patients and healthy individuals. Neurosci.
Biobehav. Rev. 47, 717–734. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.10.022
Bozeat, S., Gregory, C. A., Ralph, M. A., and Hodges, J. R. (2000).
Which neuropsychiatric and behavioral features distinguish frontal
and temporal variants of frontotemporal dementia from Alzheimer’s
disease? J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 69, 178–186. doi: 10.1136/jnnp.
69.2.178
Bozeat, S., Ralph, M. A., Patterson, K., and Hodges, J. R. (2002). The influence of
personal familiarity and context on object use in semantic dementia.Neurocase
8, 127–134. doi: 10.1093/neucas/8.1.134
Brambati, S. M., Rankin, K. P., Narvid, J., Seeley, W. W., Dean, D., and Rosen,
H. J. (2009). Atrophy progression in semantic dementia with asymmetric
temporal involvement: a tensor-based morphometry study. Neurobiol. Aging
30, 103–111. doi: 10.1016/j.neurobiolaging.2007.05.014
Brown, R., and Kulik, J. (1977). Flashbulb memories. Cognition 5, 73–99.
Bruce, V., and Young, A. (1986). Understanding face recognition. Br. J. Psychol.
77, 305–327. doi: 10.5772/8935
Burton, A. M., and Bruce, V. (1992). I recognize your face but I can’t remember
your name: a simple explanation? Br. J. Psychol. 83, 45–60. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-
8295.1992.tb02424.x
Burton, A. M., and Bruce, V. (1993). Naming faces and naming names: exploring
an interactive activation model of person recognition. Memory 1, 457–480.
doi: 10.1080/09658219308258248
Burton, A. M., Bruce, V., and Johnston, R. A. (1990). Understanding face
recognition with an interactive activation model. Br. J. Psychol. 81, 361–380.
doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1990.tb02367.x
Calabria, M., Miniussi, C., Bisiacchi, P. S., Zanetti, O., and Cotelli, M. (2009). Face-
name repetition priming in semantic dementia: a case report. Brain Cogn. 70,
231–237. doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2009.02.005
Castelli, F., Happe, F., Frith, U., and Frith, C. (2000). Movement and mind:
a functional imaging study of perception and interpretation of complex
intentional movement patterns. Neuroimage 12, 314–325. doi: 10.1006/nimg.
2000.0612
Chan, D., Fox, N. C., Scahill, R. I., Crum, W. R., Whitwell, J. L., Leschziner,
G., et al. (2001). Patterns of temporal lobe atrophy in semantic dementia and
Alzheimer’s disease. Ann. Neurol. 49, 433–442. doi: 10.3410/f.1002352.26557
Conway, M. A., Anderson, S. J., Larsen, S. F., Donnelly, C. M., McDaniel, M. A.,
McClelland, A. G., et al. (1994). The formation of flashbulb memories. Mem.
Cognit. 22, 326–343. doi: 10.4324/9780203775820
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 November 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 625
Péron et al. Personal Experience and Semantic Dementia
De Renzi, E., and Vignolo, L. A. (1962). The token test: a sensitive test to detect
receptive disturbances in aphasics. Brain 85, 665–678. doi: 10.1093/brain/
85.4.665
Deloche, G. andHannequin, D. (1997).Test de Dénomination Oral d’images DO80.
Paris: Editions Centre de Psychologie Appliquée.
Deramecourt, V., Lebert, F., Debachy, B., Mackowiak-Cordoliani, M. A., Bombois,
S., Kerdraon, O., et al. (2010). Prediction of pathology in primary progressive
language and speech disorders. Neurology 74, 42–49. doi: 10.1212/wnl.
0b013e3181c7198e
Desgranges, B., Matuszewski, V., Piolino, P., Chételat, G., Mézenge, F., Landeau,
B., et al. (2007). Anatomical and functional alterations in semantic dementia:
a voxel-based MRI and PET study. Neurobiol. Aging. 28, 1904–1913. doi: 10.
1016/j.neurobiolaging.2006.08.006
Folstein, M. F., Folstein, S., and McHugh, P. R. (1975). ‘‘Mini-Mental State’’. A
practical method for grading the cognitive state of patients for the clinician.
J. Psychiatry Res. 12, 189–198.
Funnell, E. (2001). Evidence for scripts in semantic dementia: Implications for
theories of semantic memory. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 18, 323–341. doi: 10.
1080/02643290042000134
Galton, C. J., Patterson, K., Graham, K., Lambon-Ralph, M. A., Williams, G.,
Antoun, N., et al. (2001). Differing patterns of temporal atrophy in Alzheimer’s
disease and semantic dementia. Neurology 57, 216–225. doi: 10.1212/
WNL.57.2.216
Giovannetti, T., Sestito, N., Libon, D. J., Schmidt, K. S., Gallo, J. L., Gambino, M.,
et al. (2006). The influence of personal familiarity on object naming, knowledge
and use in dementia. Arch. Clin. Neuropsychol. 21, 607–614. doi: 10.1016/j.acn.
2006.05.005
Gobbini, M., Leinbenluft, E., Santiago, N., and Haxby, J. V. (2004). Social and
emotional attachment in the neural representation of faces. Neuroimage 22,
1628–1635. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.03.049
Gorno-Tempini, M. L., Rankin, K. P., Woolley, J. D., Rosen, H. J., Phengrasamy,
L., Miller, B. L., et al. (2004). Cognitive and behavioral profile in a case of
right anterior temporal lobe neurodegeneration Cortex 40, 631–644. doi: 10.
1016/s0010-9452(08)70159-x
Goulding, P. J., Northen, B., Snowden, J. S., Macdermott, N., and Neary, D.
(1989). Progressive aphasia with right-sided extrapyramidal signs: another
manifestation of localized cerebral atrophy. J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatr 52,
128–130. doi: 10.1136/jnnp.52.1.128
Graham, K. S. (1999). Semantic dementia: a challenge to the multiple-trace theory?
Trends Cogn. Sci. 3, 85–87. doi: 10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01284-x
Graham, K. S., and Hodges, J. R. (1997). Differentiating the roles of the
hippocampal complex and the neocortex in long-term memory storage:
evidence from the study of semantic dementia and Alzheimer’s disease.
Neuropsychology 11, 77–89. doi: 10.1037/0894-4105.11.1.77
Graham, K. S., Lambon Ralph, M. A., and Hodges, J. R. (1997). Determining
the impact of autobiographical experience on ‘‘meanings’’: new insights
from investigating sports-related vocabulary and knowledge in two
cases with semantic dementia. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 14, 801–837. doi: 10.
1080/026432997381367
Graham, K. S., Patterson, K., and Hodges, J. R. (1999). Episodic memory: new
insights from the study of semantic dementia. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 9,
245–250. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198508809.003.0008
Graham, K. S., Simons, J. S., Pratt, K. H., Patterson, K., and Hodges, J. R.
(2000). Insights from semantic dementia on the relationship between episodic
and semantic memory. Neuropsychologia 38, 313–324. doi: 10.1016/s0028-
3932(99)00073-1
Greene, J. D., and Hodges, J. R. (1996). Identification of famous faces and famous
names in early Alzheimer’s disease. Relationship to anterograde episodic and
general semantic memory. Brain 119, 111–128. doi: 10.1093/brain/119.1.111
Hodges, J. R. and Graham, K. S. (1998). A reversal of the temporal gradient for
famous person knowledge in semantic dementia: implications for the neural
organization of long-term memory. Neuropsychologia 36, 803–825. doi: 10.
1016/s0028-3932(97)00126-7
Hodges, J. R. and Graham, K. S. (2001). Episodic memory: insights from semantic
dementia. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci. 356, 1423–1434. doi: 10.
1093/acprof:oso/9780198508809.003.0008
Hodges, J. R., Patterson, K., Oxbury, S., and Funnell, E. (1992). Semantic dementia.
progressive fluent aphasia with temporal lobe atrophy. Brain 115, 1783–1806.
Hodges, J. R., Salmon, D. P., and Butters, N. (1992). Semantic memory
impairment in Alzheimer’s disease: failure of access or degraded knowledge?
Neuropsychologia 30, 301–314. doi: 10.1016/0028-3932(92)90104-t
Hofmann, M. J., and Jacobs, A. M. (2014). Interactive activation and competition
models and semantic context: from behavioral to brain data. Neurosci.
Biobehav. Rev. 46, 85–104. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.06.011
Ibach, B., Poljansky, S., Marienhagen, J., Sommer, M., Männer, P., and Hajak,
G. (2004). Contrasting metabolic impairment in frontotemporal degeneration
and early onset Alzheimer’s disease. Neuroimage 23, 739–743. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2004.06.041
Joubert, S., Mauries, S., Barbeau, E., Ceccaldi, M., and Poncet, M. (2004). The role
of context in remembering familar persons: insights from semantic dementia.
Brain Cogn. 55, 254–261. doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2004.02.034
Julien, C. L., Neary, D., Neary, D., and Snowden, J. S. (2010). Personal experience
and arithmetic meaning in semantic dementia. Neuropsychologia 48, 278–287.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.014
Julien, C. L., Thompson, J. C., Neary, D., and Snowden, J. S. (2008). Arithmetic
knowledge in semantic dementia: is it invariably preserved? Neuropsychologia
46, 2732–2744. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.05.010
La Joie, R., Landeau, B., Perrotin, A., Bejanin, A., Egret, S., Pélerin, A., et al. (2014).
Intrinsic connectivity identifies the hippocampus as a main crossroad between
Alzheimer’s and semantic dementia-targeted networks.Neuron 81, 1417–1428.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2014.01.026
La Joie, R., Perrotin, A., de La Sayette, V., Egret, S., Doeuvre, L., Belliard, S.,
et al. (2013). Hippocampal subfield volumetry in mild cognitive impairment,
Alzheimer’s disease and semantic dementia. Neuroimage Clin. 3, 155–162.
doi: 10.1016/j.nicl.2013.08.007
Laisney, M., Giffard, B., Belliard, S., de la Sayette, V., Desgranges, B., Eustache,
F., et al. (2011). When the zebra loses its stripes: semantic priming in early
Alzheimer’s disease and semantic dementia. Cortex 47, 35–46. doi: 10.1016/j.
cortex.2009.11.001
Lezak, M. (1976). Neuropsychological Assessment, New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Lough, S., Kipps, C. M., Treise, C., Watson, P., Blair, J. R., and Hodges, J. R.
(2006). Social reasoning, emotion and empathy in frontotemporal dementia.
Neuropsychologia 44, 950–958. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2005.08.009
Markowitsch, H. J. (1995). ‘‘Anatomical basis of memory disorders,’’ in The
Cognitive Neurosciences, ed. M. S. Gazzaniga (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
665–679.
Mattis, S. (1988). Dementia Rating Scale. Lutz, FL: Psychological Assessment.
Merck, C., Jonin, P. Y., Vichard, H., Boursiquot Sle, M., Leblay, V., and Belliard,
S. (2013). Relative category-specific preservation in semantic dementia?
Evidence from 35 cases. Brain Lang. 124, 257–267. doi: 10.1016/j.bandl.2013.
01.003
Mion, M., Patterson, K., Acosta-Cabronero, J., Pengas, G., Izquierdo-Garcia, D.,
Hong, Y. T., et al. (2010). What the left and right anterior fusiform gyri tell us
about semantic memory. Brain 133, 3256–3268. doi: 10.1093/brain/awq272
Mummery, C. J., Patterson, K., Price, C. J., Ashburner, J., Frackowiak, R. S., and
Hodges, J. R. (2000). A voxel-based morphometry study of semantic dementia:
relationship between temporal lobe atrophy and semantic memory. Ann.
Neurol. 47, 36–45. doi: 10.1002/1531-8249(200001)47:1<36::AID-ANA8>3.3.
CO;2-C
Mummery, C. J., Patterson, K., Wise, R. J., Vandenberghe, R., Price, C. J.,
and Hodges, J. R. (1999). Disrupted temporal lobe connections in semantic
dementia. Brain 122, 61–73. doi: 10.1093/brain/122.1.61
Neary, D., and Snowden, J. (1988). Fronto temporal lobar degeneration. a
consensus on clinicla diagnostic criteria. Neurology 51, 1546–1554.
Neggers, S. F., Van der Lubbe, R. H., Ramsey, N. F., and Postma, A. (2006).
Interactions between ego- and allocentric neuronal representations of space.
Neuroimage 31, 320–331. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.028
Nelson, H. E. (1976). A modified card sorting test sensitive to frontal lobe defects.
Cortex 12, 313–324. doi: 10.1016/s0010-9452(76)80035-4
Neumann, M., Sampathu, D. M., Kwong, L. K., Truax, A. C., Micsenyi, M. C.,
Chou, T. T., et al. (2006). Ubiquitinated TDP-43 in frontotemporal lobar
degeneration and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Science 314, 130–133. doi: 10.
3410/f.1047677.14078057
Piolino, P., Desgranges, B., Belliard, S., Matuszewski, V., Lalevée, C., De la Sayette,
V., et al. (2003). Autobiographicalmemory and autonoetic consciousness: triple
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 11 November 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 625
Péron et al. Personal Experience and Semantic Dementia
dissociation in neurodegenerative diseases. Brain 126, 2203–2219. doi: 10.
1093/brain/awg222
Piolino, P., Desgranges, B., and Eustache, F. (2009). Episodic autobiographical
memories over the course of time: cognitive, neuropsychological and
neuroimaging findings. Neuropsychologia 47, 2314–2329. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2009.01.020
Piolino, P., Lamidey, V., Desgranges, B., and Eustache, F. (2007). The semantic and
episodic subcomponents of famous person knowledge: dissociation in healthy
subjects. Neuropsychology 21, 122–135. doi: 10.1037/0894-4105.21.1.122
Rankin, K. P., Kramer, J. H., and Miller, B. L. (2005). Patterns of cognitive and
emotional empathy in frontotemporal lobar degeneration.Cogn. Behav. Neurol.
18, 28–36. doi: 10.1097/01.wnn.0000152225.05377.ab
Raven, J. (1965). Guide to Using the Coloured Progressive Matrices, London: Lewis.
Reitan, R. (1958). Validity of the trail making test as an indication of organic brain
damage. Percept. Motor Skill 8, 271–276. doi: 10.2466/pms.8.7.271-276
Saxe, R. and Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about thinking people. The
role of the temporo-parietal junction in ‘‘theory of mind’’. Neuroimage 19,
1835–1842. doi: 10.1016/s1053-8119(03)00230-1
Short, R. A., Broderick, D. F., Patton, A., Arvanitakis, Z., and Graff-Radford,
N. R. (2005). Different patterns of magnetic resonance imaging atrophy for
frontotemporal lobar degeneration syndromes. Arch. Neurol. 62, 1106–1110.
doi: 10.1001/archneur.62.7.1106
Snowden, J. S. (1999). Semantic dysfunction in frontotemporal lobar degeneration.
Dement. Geriatr. Cogn. Disord. 10, 33–36. doi: 10.1159/000051209
Snowden, J. S., Goulding, P., and Neary, D. (1989). Semantic dementia : a form of
circumscribed cerebral atrophy. Beh. Neurol. 2, 167–182.
Snowden, J. S., Griffith, H. R., and Neary, D. (1994). Semantic dementia :
autobigraphical contributions to preservation of meaning. Cogn. Neuropsychol.
11, 265–288. doi: 10.1080/02643299408251976
Snowden, J. S., Griffith, H. R., and Neary, D. (1995). Autobiographical experience
and word meaning.Memory 3, 225–246. doi: 10.1080/09658219508253152
Snowden, J. S., Griffith, H. R., and Neary, D. (1996a). Semantic-episodic memory
interactions in semantic dementia: implications for retrograde memory
function. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 13, 1101–1137. doi: 10.1080/026432996381674
Snowden, J. S., Neary, D. and Mann, D. (1996b). Fronto-Temporal Lobar
Degeneration: Fronto-Temporal Dementia, Progressive Aphasia, Semantic
Dementia. London: Churchill Livingstone.
Snowden, J., Bathgate, D., Varma, A., Blackshaw, A., Gibbons, Z. C., and Neary, D.
(2001). Distinct behavioral profiles in frontotemporal dementia and semantic
dementia. J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 70, 323–332. doi: 10.1136/jnnp.
70.3.323
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. J. Exp. Psychol.
18, 643–662. doi: 10.1037/h0054651
Sugiura, M., Sassa, Y., Watanabe, J., Akitsuki, Y., Maeda, Y., Matsue, Y., et al.
(2006). Cortical mechanisms of person representation: recognition of famous
and personally familiar names. Neuroimage 31, 853–860. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2006.01.002
Valentine, T., Brennen, T. and Brédart, S. (1996). On the Importance of Being
Earnest the Cognitive Psychology of Proper Names. London: Routledge.
Van Lancker, D. (1991). Personal relevance and the human right hemisphere.
Brain Cogn. 17, 64–92. doi: 10.1016/0278-2626(91)90067-i
Viard, A., Desgranges, B., Matuszewski, V., Lebreton, K., Belliard, S., de La Sayette,
V., et al. (2013). Autobiographical memory in semantic dementia: new insights
from two patients using fMRI. Neuropsychologia 51, 2620–2632. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2013.08.007
Viard, A., Piolino, P., Belliard, S., de La Sayette, V., Desgranges, B., and Eustache,
F. (2014). Episodic future thinking in semantic dementia: a cognitive and FMRI
study. PLoS One 9:e111046. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0111046
Violon, A. and Wijns, C. (1984). Le test de la Ruche. Test de Perception et
d’apprentissage Progressif en Mémoire Visuelle. Braine le Château; Belgique:
L’Application des techniques modernes.
Warrington, E. K. (1975). The selective impairment of semantic memory.Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. 27, 635–657.
Weschler, D. (1991). Echelle Clinique de Mémoire Révisée. Paris: Les Éditions du
Centre de Psychologie Appliquée.
Westmacott, R., Black, S. E., Freedman, M., and Moscovitch, M. (2004). The
contribution of autobiographical significance to semantic memory: evidence
from Alzheimer’s disease, semantic dementia and amnesia. Neuropsychologia
42, 25–48. doi: 10.1016/s0028-3932(03)00147-7
Westmacott, R., Leach, L., Freedman, M., and Moscovitch, M. (2001). Different
patterns of autobiographical memory loss in semantic dementia and medial
temporal lobe amnesia: a challenge to consolidation theory.Neurocase 7, 37–55.
doi: 10.1093/neucas/7.1.55
Westmacott, R., and Moscovitch, M. (2003). The contribution of autobiographical
significance to semantic memory. Mem. Cognit. 31, 761–774. doi: 10.
3758/bf03196114
Young, A. W. and Bruce, V. (2011). Understanding person perception. Br. J.
Psychol. 102, 959–974. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.2011.02045.x
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Péron, Piolino, Le Moal-Boursiquot, Biseul, Leray, Bon,
Desgranges, Eustache and Belliard. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution and reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 12 November 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 625
